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This paper examines whether government-sponsored export credit arrangements have the
same effect on trade as direct export subsidies. The export credit programs for several major
agricultural exporters are described. These programs are compared to OECD disciplines for
export credit arrangements, and the consequences of extending these guidelines to agricul-
ture are analysed. None of the programs discussed would be consistent with the OECD
guidelines. Since export credit arrangements have many of the same characteristics as tar-
geted export subsidies, the same analytical framework can be used to analyse these pro-
grams. However, it is necessary to determine implicit subsidy values for the program.
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1. Introduction
E
xport credit arrangements are typical components of export sales. Broadly defined, an
export credit arrangement arises whenever a foreign buyer of an exported good or ser-
vice is allowed to defer the payment. Typically, financial institutions handle most of the
financing associated with export credit arrangements. However, government involvement
comes in the form of providing guarantees or insurance on the financial transactions, sub-
sidising interest rates, or making direct credits or financing available.
Vol um e   1   N um be r  1 , 2 00 0/   p. 6 6 - 8 2 e s t ey j o u r n a l . c o mBoth direct export subsidies and export credits can be used to develop new markets and
to compete in existing markets. A direct export subsidy provides an explicit price subsidy
to either the exporting or importing agent, lowering the price of the traded good.
Government-sponsored export credit arrangements typically result in loan conditions that
are better than those offered by the market, thus reducing the importer’s cost of financing
and possibly resulting in  increased trade. Hence, either export credit arrangements or
direct export subsidies can be used to benefit a particular exporter at the expense of its
competitors.
The use of officially sponsored export credits has declined from a peak in the early
1990s as the former Soviet Union has effectively left the export credit market. The Asian
financial crisis renewed the use of officially sponsored export credit arrangements. For
instance, during the 1997-98 crop year the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) offered $250
million in credit to Indonesia and a $35 million credit package to South Korea. In 1998
approximately 15 percent of U.S. wheat exports, on a volume basis, were sold under export
credit arrangements. In the same year the CWB sold approximately 7 percent, on a value
basis, of its wheat, durum, feed and malting barley exports on a credit basis. 
To date, most subsidisation of sales to international agricultural markets involves direct
export subsidies (e.g., European Union’s export restitution system or the U.S. Export
Enhancement Program). However, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)
has introduced disciplines on the use of export subsidies. Concern has been raised that
export credits can be used as a method to circumvent the export subsidy commitments of
the URAA. 
This paper addresses the question of whether export credit guarantees have the same
effect on trade as direct export subsidies. Should these credit arrangements be disciplined
in the same manner as direct export subsidies? The second section of the paper describes
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) export subsidy disciplines and other arrangements
affecting export credits. The third section describes the major agricultural export credit
programs for a number of major agricultural exporters. The fourth section describes the
effects of direct export subsidies. The fifth section examines how export credits influence
trade. Together, the fourth and fifth sections address the question of whether officially
sponsored export credit program guarantees have the same effect on trade as direct export
subsidies have. The sixth section examines the consequences of extending the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) export credit disciplines to agricul-
ture. The seventh section provides concluding comments.
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E
xport credits can be used to make the terms of the sale more attractive than the terms
provided by a competitor. This is why the WTO disciplines the provision of officially
supported export credits. For industrial products, the provision of export credits is disci-
plined by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The SCM pro-
hibits export subsidies, including “the provision by governments … of export credit guar-
antee or insurance programmes … at premium rates, which are inadequate to cover the
long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes” (SCM Annex I paragraph j) and
subsidised interest rates (SCM Annex I paragraph k). However, an export credit practice
will not be considered an export subsidy if the export credit arrangement is in compliance
with the OECD’s Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (the
“Arrangement”). 
The “Arrangement” (OECD, 1998) places limits on the terms and conditions under
which export credits can be provided. It applies to export credits with a repayment term of
two years or more. The “Arrangement” (i) lays down maximum repayment periods; (ii)
establishes minimum interest rates thereby limiting their use as a vehicle for subsidy; (iii)
restricts coverage to a maximum of 85 percent of the export contract value; and (iv) estab-
lishes minimum premium benchmarks. These requirements are discussed in more detail in
section 6, where specific agriculture credit programs are examined in the context of
whether they would comply with the OECD “Arrangement.”
As with other WTO disciplines, agricultural commodity export credit programs are
provided with special treatment. Agricultural export credit arrangements are exempted
from the disciplines of the SCM and are excluded from the OECD “Arrangement.” The
provision of direct agricultural export subsidies is governed by the rules and country com-
mitments of the Agreement on Agriculture. Article 10, “Prevention of Circumvention of
Export Subsidy Commitments,” paragraph 2, commits members to work towards an inter-
national agreement on disciplines for export credits, export guarantees and export credit
insurance programs. A set of negotiations on an arrangement covering export credits for
agricultural products was initiated by the OECD but to date no agreement has been
reached.
3. Major Agricultural Export Credit Programs
United States
The United States has several programs that provide export credit guarantees for agricul-
tural products (FAS Summary of Program Activities, 1999). The main credit guarantee pro-
grams are the General Service Management programs, GSM-102 and GSM-103, which
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operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit Corporation (USDA
CCC). GSM-102 is used to guarantee short-term credit of three years or less from U.S.
banks at commercial rates. GSM-103 is used to guarantee credit for between three and ten
years at commercial interest rates. The General Service Management export credit guaran-
tees cover 98 percent of the port value plus a portion of the accrued interest which is not
to exceed 55 percent for GSM-102 and not to exceed 80 percent for GSM-103. Interest
rates charged under these programs are the prime rate or a variant of the London Interbank
Offer Rate (LIBOR). These interest rates are lower than those that would be charged with-
out the credit guarantee, because the exporters assume less risk. 
Exporters are charged a premium for the credit guarantee. These fees range from 0.15
to 0.67 percent of the guaranteed value of exports under GSM-102, to 1.5 to 2.67 percent
under GSM-103.
Congress determines the maximum amount of credit exposure allowed for GSM-102
and 103, and the USDA establishes recommendations for country allocations of credit
guarantees. The U.S. government allots $5.7 billion annually. In the fiscal year 1999,
GSM-102 was allocated US $5.1 billion while registrations totalled US $3 billion. GSM-
103 was allocated US $377 million while registrations totalled US $44.2 million.
The United States also offers the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP), which
provides short-term credit (180 days or less) directly to buyers. 
The Public Law 480 (P.L. 480) program was established in 1954 from a combination
of credit and aid programs. Unlike most other aid programs, P.L. 480 includes both direct
aid and concessional financing. Title I of P.L. 480 was authorised for credit sales to foreign
countries with payments received in foreign currency. Title I now contains provisions for
debt forgiveness, and concessional sales for those countries which have the ability to repay.
C a n a d a
Canada provides guaranteed credit through the Department of Finance and the Export
Development Corporation (EDC). The Minister of Finance guarantees credit sales of grains
under the Credit Grain Sales Program (CGSP) and the Agri-Food Credit Facility (ACF).
The CGSPguarantees wheat and barley sales by the CWB. The ACF guarantee covers both
CWB grains and other agri-food commodities.
Under the EDC programs, exporters may assign their foreign receivables to a Canadian
bank so that cash is paid when the sale is made. The Canadian bank is then responsible for
collecting the payment. The EDC programs provide cover to the lending institutions. The
EDC provides short-term (typically under 180 days) guarantees for both agricultural and
non-agricultural exports. Coverage under the EDC programs varies from 90 to 95 percent
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vices. The value of business support provided in 1997 by the EDC was worth $286 billion.
Under the Credit Grain Sales Program, the CWB finances credit sales at market inter-
est rates. Financing is arranged through Canadian chartered banks for maturities of 6 to 36
months. Credit lines are guaranteed in full by the Canadian government. Credit-guaranteed
sales are only made to importers who have obtained a sovereign guarantee from their gov-
ernment. The CWB is not charged a fee when it uses this program. Likewise, no fee is
required for importers participating in the program, but a down payment, which varies with
the credit risk of the importer, is required. On March 31, 1999 approximately $6.7 billion
was recorded as a receivable under the Credit Grain Sales Program.
A second program, the Agri-Food Credit Facility, offers credit sales to non-sovereign
importers. The CWB is not charged a fee for this program, but it does assume a portion of
the risk depending on the length of the credit term. Guarantees range from 98 percent for
loans of less than one year, to 92 percent for terms of between two and three years. In 1998,
approximately $23.8 million was due from foreign customers under the CWB’s portion of
this program.
A u s t r a l i a
The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) offers guarantees on credit sales
made on a commercial basis. Terms for EFIC insurance are up to three years. EFIC charges
a premium for its insurance and requires that exporters carry a portion of the risk. The
exporter’s portion of the risk is 20 percent in most cases. Premium rates vary according to
the risk of the transaction and range between 2 and 3 percent.
4. Effects of Direct Export Subsidies
T
he use of industrial export subsidies is strictly forbidden by the WTO (developing
country exports are excepted). Agriculture provides an exception to this stricture and
existing export subsidies are permissible under the URAA. Nonetheless, agricultural
export subsidies are disciplined and subject to reduction commitments. Why are export
subsidies viewed so negatively while the WTO will tolerate domestic production subsi-
dies? The reason is that in the market of the country providing the export subsidy, produc-
er and consumer prices are raised by the export subsidy; this rise, in turn, increases pro-
duction and decreases consumption (see the technical annex for details). As a result,
exports from the subsidising country increase. Prices in the rest of the world decrease, so
that consumption increases and production decreases. The effects on trade of an export
subsidy exceed the effects of an equal domestic production subsidy. A production subsidy
increases domestic producer prices but leaves consumer prices unchanged. As a result,
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(unless the increased production is sufficient to depress world prices).
5. How Do Export Credits Influence 
Trade, and Are They Export Subsidies?
T
he guarantee removes from the lender any risk that the borrowing enterprise might
default on its loan. In effect, the loan guarantee transfers the risk of non-repayment
from the private sector credit supplier to the agency providing the guarantee. When an
exporter has a better credit rating than a prospective importer, the exporter may offer the
importer a more favourable interest rate than is otherwise available to the importer.
Therefore the private lender will not have to impose as large a risk premium and the
importer will face a lower cost for buying the commodity in question.
The face value of credit guarantees is often used as a measure of the size of the pro-
gram, but this approach estimates neither the program’s costs nor its effects on trade. The
problem of finding the subsidy value of the credit guarantee has been addressed by a num-
ber of authors (Barichello and Vercammen, 1994; Baron, 1983; Raynauld, 1992; and
Hyberg et al., 1995). The extension of the credit guarantee, by reducing risks to the lender,
makes it possible for the importer to borrow at less than the true interest cost. Therefore the
credit guarantee provides an implicit interest rate subsidy.All the studies noted above have
the common element of measuring implicit interest rate subsidies as a function of the dif-
ference between the interest rate adopted by the credit agency and a reference market inter-
est rate.1 The question that remains is: What is the appropriate reference interest rate? This
rate should correspond to the actuarially fair rate of interest associated with expected
potential default by the borrower in question. An actuarially fair rate of interest ensures that
the present value of the expected sum of payments for the recipient country just equals the
cash value of the commodity at the time of delivery. If there is no subsidy, then an actuar-
ially fair interest rate would be applied.  
The effect of an interest rate subsidy can be converted into a price discount or price
subsidy. The price faced by the borrowing country on a credit sale should be higher than
the price paid by a cash customer. This difference should account for the opportunity cost
of funds and the risk associated with the borrower. If these costs are not accounted for,
there is an export subsidy. The price discount is measured by the proportion of the true unit
export value that the importer pays (see Baron, 1983, p. 148).
Once the interest rate subsidy can be put into terms of price subsidy, the economist’s
tools of excess supply and excess demand can be applied to determine the impact on prices
and quantities traded (see the technical annex). Traditionally economists model an export
subsidy as an outward shift in the excess supply function, which lowers world prices,
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trade flows. The effect of an export credit guarantee is different. In this case the terms of
the guarantee are specific to a particular market, so the effect of the price subsidy is tar-
geted to a specific market. Targeted export subsidies, unlike general export subsidies,
increase prices in more than just the subsidising country. The prices (consumer and pro-
ducer) in all non-targeted markets increase while the price in the targeted market declines.
The difference between these two prices is equal to the export subsidy (see the technical
annex, figure A.3). The relative magnitude of the import demand elasticities (that is, the
responsiveness of quantity demanded to price changes) in the different markets determines
how much of the subsidy translates into higher prices in non-targeted markets and lower
prices in targeted markets. If the principles of price discrimination are followed, prices in
the most inelastic markets (non-responsive markets) rise more than prices in elastic mar-
kets fall.2 Several authors (Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharples, 1987; Skully, 1992; and
Vercammen, 1998) have drawn comparisons between price discrimination and targeted
export subsidies. With targeted export subsidies the effects on third-country exporters need
not be negative, as they are in the case of general export subsidies. Export revenues for a
third-country exporter may increase if a sufficient portion of its sales are to non-targeted
markets and if prices in these markets increase more than prices in targeted markets are
depressed.
In addition to the implicit interest rate subsidy, export credit agencies also often do not
charge the exporter the full insurance cost of guaranteeing the credit sale, so there is an
insurance premium subsidy as well. The effects of premium subsidisation are more
straightforward to model than those for the targeted effects of the interest rate subsidies.
The premium subsidy translates into higher domestic prices in the subsidising market.
Hence, the effect is much like a general export subsidy, where prices fall in all markets but
the one where the subsidy originates. This effect alone makes all third-country exporters
worse off.
6. Consequences of Extending 
the OECD “Arrangement” to A g r i c u l t u r e
E
xport credit programs will be discussed in the next round of negotiations for the
Agreement on Agriculture. One possible discipline for agricultural export credit pro-
grams is to extend the rules for industrial products to the agriculture sector. This implies
that the OECD “Arrangement” could be applied to agricultural products. The most impor-
tant conditions of the OECD “Arrangement” are that (i) minimum interest rates should be
established; (ii) cash payments are at least 15 percent of the value of the export sale; (iii) a
maximum repayment period should be recognised; and (iv) minimum premium bench-
72
J. Rude
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d emarks should be followed. Canadian and U.S. agricultural export credit programs are next
judged by whether they comply with these criteria. Each of these conditions is considered
in turn below.
Minimum Interest Rates
The minimum interest rates for the OECD “Arrangement” are defined as relevant
Commercial Interest Reference Rates (CIRR). These rates are established according to the
principle that the reference rates represent commercial rates in the domestic market of the
currency concerned. The CIRR rates are to be set 1 percent above a base rate. The base
rates are three-year government bond yields for loans with terms up to five years, five-year
government bond yields for loans with terms up to eight and one-half years, and seven-year
government bond yields for loans up to ten years. The interest rates charged for the
Canadian CGSP and AFC programs, and for the U.S. GSM-102 and GSM-103 programs,
should comply with this provision because they are based on commercial interest rates,
which should exceed the CIRR minimum. 
Down Payments
The OECD “Arrangement” requires cash payments of 15 percent of the export value at or
before the starting point of the credit transaction. The U.S. programs do not comply with
this down payment requirement. Neither Canada’s CGSP nor its ACF has a legal require-
ment for a cash down payment. However, the willingness of the buyer to make a cash down
payment is part of the overall risk analysis required for a credit application. Dahl et al.
claim that the down payment for programs run through the CWB is typically 10 to 15 per-
cent of the export sale.
Maximum Repayment Te r m s
An automatic classification system was introduced into the OECD “Arrangement” to deter-
mine maximum repayment terms based on per capita GNP figures, so that the longest
repayment terms are available only to the poorest countries. The OECD “Arrangement”
classifies countries into two categories. For Category I countries the repayment term is five
years.3 For Category II countries the maximum repayment term is ten years. The Canadian
programs are under three years, so they comply with this requirement. GSM-102 also com-
plies with this requirement, since the loan period is less than three years. GSM-103 may
present a problem if the loan is provided to a Category I country for a period from five to
ten years.
Minimum Premiums
The OECD “Arrangement” provides guidance for establishing minimum premium bench-
marks. A number of elements of country risk assessment are to be considered: an importer
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Risks are to be scored according to quantitative risk models. The scoring results in import-
ing countries being classified into seven risk categories. The premium-setting guidelines
are consistent with the obligation under the rules of the WTO that premium fees should be
adequate to cover long-term operating costs and losses. The premium-guidance bench-
marks (known as the Knaepen Package) were not approved until 1997 and the package did
not become effective until April 1999. Thus, at present, many industrial product credit
arrangements may not yet comply with the “Arrangement.”
In Canada the Export Development Corporation sets premiums based on private mar-
ket pricing references such as option pricing models. Therefore EDC premiums should
comply with the OECD requirements for premium setting. The CGSP and ACF programs,
which the CWB uses for its export credit sales, do not assess a premium rate. In the United
States GSM-102 assesses premium rates of 0.15 to 0.67 percent of the guaranteed value of
export sales. The GSM-103 program assesses a premium of 1.5 to 2.67 percent of the guar-
anteed value of export sales.
While the Canadian CGSP and ACF programs do not even assess a premium for the
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Table 1 Terms and Conditions of Export Credit Programs of Major Exportersguarantee, it is very unlikely that the U.S. General Services Management export credit
guarantee programs would comply with the risk assessment procedures described in the
OECD  “Arrangement.” 
In summary, if the major agriculture credit programs were subject to the OECD
“Arrangement” some changes would be required. In particular, guiding principles for set-
ting minimum risk-based premiums would be required. As well, several programs would
require down payment provisions. Table 1 summarises the important features of some of
the major agricultural export credit programs.
7. Concluding Comments on Export Credit Disciplines
E
xport credits have many of the same characteristics as direct export subsidies. This is
not to say that inferences about the distorting effects of credit programs can be drawn
by the common practice of simply examining the face value of the credit guarantee.
Detecting distortions requires relatively complex methods to determine the implicit sub-
sidy associated with the risk reduction implied by the program. This implicit subsidy can
then be used to determine a unit-export subsidy equivalent for the program. Given this
information, the same analytical framework as is used for analysing direct export subsidies
can be used to measure the trade impact of export credit programs.
Beyond measuring the impact of the program, can the subsidy equivalent be used to
discipline the provision of export credits? One possible avenue would be to measure the
subsidy equivalents for supported export credit programs and establish an upper limit for
the subsidy equivalents. This process would be similar to the disciplines on export subsi-
dies in the Agreement on Agriculture. This course of action does not recommend itself
because export credits for industrial products are regulated in a different manner.
Furthermore, export credit programs are primarily for sales to developing countries, where
fully functioning credit markets may not exist. Hence, it is recognised that, unlike direct
export subsidies, export credits can play a useful role in international trade. The develop-
ment of subsidy equivalents may nonetheless prove to be a useful tool to monitor the use
of export credits. 
Agricultural export credit programs are not covered by the disciplines of the OECD
Export Credit “Arrangement.” If these programs were to be subject to the “Arrangement,”
then changes to these programs would be required.
Are the disciplines of the OECD “Arrangement” sufficient? The current minimum
interest rates, the CIRRs, are minimum interest rates at which the lending agency can bor-
row (long-term government bond rates), but they do not reflect the rate at which importers
would have to pay in international capital markets. An arbitrary mark-up of 1 percent above
a government-borrowing rate does not reflect the risks associated with the potential default
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somewhat arbitrary and not based on modern risk management techniques such as option
pricing. These minimum premiums probably do not reflect an actuarially fair risk premi-
um that recovers the full cost of insurance. The OECD “Arrangement” has only just begun
to apply minimum premium rates. The motivation for this discipline was the fact that
export credit agencies were incurring long-run losses. Drummond shows that the net cash
flow of export credit agencies was negative every year between 1990 and 1995. The new
premium disciplines should help to reduce long-term losses. Whether the minimum pre-
mium rates get around the subsidisation problem remains to be seen. What continues to be
a problem for industrial products should be doubly a concern for agricultural products,
which are not disciplined at all.
To be consistent with the WTO’s current distinction of permitting production subsidies
while prohibiting export subsidies, the WTO probably should prohibit subsidised export
credit arrangements and encourage credit programs that do not discriminate between
domestic and foreign transactions. However, from a more pragmatic perspective, it is
unlikely that governments will give up official support of export credit programs. The pro-
vision of export credits and export credit guarantees, across all sectors, is too prevalent for
a groundswell of support to develop for the elimination these programs. Furthermore, gov-
ernment-backed export credit is sometimes justified as responding to market imperfec-
tions. These imperfections are only vaguely defined. The reasons that private risk markets
may not fully develop include political risk and commercial risks to do with international
trade. Commercial risks include differences in legal systems between countries, which
would inhibit the repossession of assets that could be used as collateral. Other problems
include information asymmetries between countries, which prevent the development of
insurance markets. The final justification is that developing countries have poorly devel-
oped credit markets. The issue of development will always be tied to the provision of
export credits. This is an issue that will not go away in any future round of WTO negotia-
tions where developing countries play a significant role. The implications for developing
countries of extending the OECD “Arrangement” to agriculture probably would be minor.
Although export credit arrangements, at least in theory, should be disciplined in the
same  manner  as  direct  export  subsidies,  there  is  little  chance  of  this  happening.
Agricultural export credit programs are currently not subject to discipline. These programs
need to be brought into the WTO fold of disciplines by applying equal treatment for both
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1.  The subsidy value is determined by taking the difference between the payment for
borrowing privately and present values of both the principal and interest payments
made by the credit agency. The discount rate is the interest rate which the importer
would have had to pay on international markets.
2.   Third degree price discrimination requires three necessary conditions (1) no arbi-
trage opportunities, (2) different demand elasticities between markets, and (3) the
ability to exercise market power (i.e., set prices above marginal costs). If these condi-
tions are present the firm can increase revenues, and hence profits, by re-allocating
sales from more elastic markets to more inelastic markets. The decreased prices in
elastic markets are more than compensated for by increased sales. Decreased sales in
inelastic markets are more than compensated for by increased prices
3.   In certain instances, with prior notification to the OCED, the repayment term can be
extended to eight and one-half years.
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